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INTRODUCTION 
Over the course of the last decade, a problem slowly made its way to the 
forefront of national consciousness.  Hundreds of thousands of sexual assault 
evidence kits, also known as rape kits, were collected, stored, and forgotten.1  
                                                        
* Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2019, American University Washington College of Law; 
Bachelor of Arts, 2016, College of William and Mary. I want to thank my editors, 
especially Katherine Holcombe, for their invaluable advice and guidance through the 
writing process. Thank you also to the publication team and the rest of the Journal staff 
for their tireless dedication in preparing this piece for publication. Finally, I want to thank 
my family, friends, and loved ones, without whose love and support this Comment truly 
could not have been written. 
 1. See Jill E. Daly, Gathering Dust on the Evidence Shelves of the United States – 
Rape Victims and Their Kits: Do Rape Victims Have Recourse Against State and Federal 
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As interest in this issue grew, more media outlets turned their attention to 
this growing backlog.2  Advocacy groups worked to educate elected officials 
and the general public, and solutions began to emerge on the state and federal 
level.3  Several states passed legislation to address the existing backlog and 
ensure that kits will be tested more efficiently in the future.4  At the federal 
level, Congress passed several bills targeting rape kit backlogs, although 
with limited success.5 
Now that many jurisdictions are seeing the number of untested rape kits 
decrease, another problem has arisen.  As a result of years-long delays in kit 
testing, collected evidence that can identify a suspect is sometimes unusable 
because the statute of limitations for prosecuting the rape or sexual assault 
has expired.6  Statutes of limitations are an important feature of criminal law 
because they promote prompt prosecutions, reduce uncertainty, and allow 
both defendants and society to have a sense of repose about old crimes.7  
However, given the backlog of unprocessed rape kits and the gravity of sex 
crimes, legislative exceptions to statutes of limitations are appropriate.8  
Many states have already integrated DNA exceptions into their limitation 
laws, while other states have done away with statutes of limitations for sex 
                                                          
Criminal Justice Systems?, 25 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 17, 22 (2003) (asserting that in 
the United States, as of 2003, there were 500,000 untested rape kits). 
 2. See Steve Reilly, Tens of thousands of rape kits go untested across USA, USA 
TODAY (Jul. 16, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/07/16/untested-
rape-kits-evidence-across-usa/29902199/ (describing investigative efforts by journalists 
to obtain an accurate number of untested kits). 
 3. See Glenne Ellen Fucci, No Law and No Order: Local, State, and Federal 
Government Responses to the United States Rape Kit Backlog Crisis, 14 CARDOZO PUB. 
L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 193, 208-09, 216-18, 221 (2015) (detailing state and federal laws 
introduced and passed in attempt to end the backlog). 
 4. See id. at 209-17 (reporting four main types of state-level bills: inventory bills, 
mandatory future testing bills, comprehensive testing bills, and survivor bills). 
 5. See id. at 217-18 (noting that while the Debbie Smith Act and SAFER Act were 
important steps made by Congress, the number of untested kits remains high). 
 6. See generally Jonathan W. Diehl, Note, Drafting a Fair DNA Exception to the 
Statute of Limitations in Sexual Assault Cases, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 431, 431, 439 (1999) 
(recommending DNA exceptions to statutes of limitations that balance the interests of 
victims with the rights of defendants). 
 7. See Lauren Kearns, Note, Incorporating Tolling Provisions into Sex Crimes 
Statutes of Limitations, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 325, 327 (2003) (examining 
the general background of statutes of limitations). 
 8. See id. at 357 (explaining, in the context of child sexual abuse, how delays in 
reporting and testing make tolling exceptions necessary to prosecute the widest possible 
amount of sex crimes). 
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offenses altogether.9  These provisions, along with other efforts by advocates 
and lawmakers, have made progress in ending the rape kit backlog in many 
jurisdictions.10 
In New York, courts have interpreted the tolling provision of the criminal 
statute of limitations in such a way that allows the period of limitation to toll 
while a defendant’s whereabouts are unknown – for example, if an unknown 
sexual assailant cannot be identified until a rape kit is tested.11  While New 
Hampshire’s limitation statute contains a similarly-worded tolling provision, 
the New Hampshire courts have not interpreted the provision to include a 
DNA tolling exception.12  This comment argues that New Hampshire should 
follow the reasoning laid out in New York case law that allows the statute of 
limitations on sexual offenses to toll until a victim’s rape kit has been 
processed.13  Part II describes the current state of tolling exceptions for sex 
offenses in New York and New Hampshire.14  Part III argues that New 
Hampshire’s failure to include a DNA exception to its statute of limitations 
for sexual assault is an incorrect interpretation of its tolling statute that 
hinders effective prosecution.15  Part IV recommends that, in the absence of 
statutory language authorizing a DNA exception, New Hampshire should 
utilize the same common law strategy used in New York to introduce the 
exception.16  Part V concludes by reiterating that exceptions that toll statutes 
                                                          
 9. See Brittany Ericksen & Ilse Knecht, Statutes of Limitations for Sexual Assault: 
A State-by-State Comparison, NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, https://victimsof
crime.org/docs/DNA%20Resource%20Center/sol-for-sexual-assault-check-chart---
final---copy.pdf?sfvrsn=2 (last updated Aug. 21, 2013) (concluding that 27 states have 
enacted some form of DNA exception to statutes of limitations). 
 10. See State Responses, END THE BACKLOG, http://www.endthebacklog.org/ending-
backlog/state-responses (last visited Oct. 5, 2017) (listing various responses from state 
governments that have improved kit testing rates).  
 11. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10 (McKinney 2014) (tolling the statute of 
limitations when a defendant’s whereabouts are unknown); see also People v. Seda, 712 
N.E.2d 682, 685 (N.Y. 1999) (creating the DNA exception in New York by concluding 
that a person’s whereabouts include his identity). 
 12. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:8 (2014) (tolling the limitation period for 
felonies when the defendant’s abode or workplace are unascertainable). 
 13. See People v. Harrison, 803 N.Y.S.2d 5, 6-7 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (holding that 
prosecution for rape is not time-barred when defendant’s whereabouts are unknown and 
a DNA sample remains untested). 
 14. See infra Part II (comparing the statutes of limitations for sex offenses in New 
York and New Hampshire). 
 15. See infra Part III (asserting that DNA exceptions to statutes of limitations balance 
the victims’ interests with the defendants’ rights). 
 16. See infra Part IV (recommending that New Hampshire courts adopt the common 
law DNA exception used in New York courts). 
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of limitations, while DNA evidence remains untested, balance the needs of 
victims with the rights of defendants.17 
I. BACKGROUND  
Statutes of limitations have a long and well-established place in the 
American legal landscape.  However, despite its longevity, there are several 
conflicting rationales for the doctrine’s existence.18  The most common 
justifications for statutes of limitations are promoting repose, preserving 
fresh evidence for prompt prosecution, and protecting defendants from unfair 
trials.19 
The concept of repose may seem counterintuitive at first, but it serves a 
variety of purposes for defendants, victims, and potentially interested third-
parties, such as witnesses.20  Even victims gain some benefit from limitations 
to prosecution; for example, reopening an old case may bring back traumatic 
memories for a victim or disturb the peace of mind the victim has gained 
since the offense occurred.21 
Another commonly cited reason for implementing statutes of limitations 
is to encourage prompt prosecution while evidence is fresh.22  Limiting the 
time in which a prosecution can be brought requires prosecutors to gather 
evidence before it deteriorates or is destroyed, which increases the overall 
accuracy of the investigation.23  Some scholars suggest that this rationale 
serves more to convenience the court than to facilitate accurate fact-finding, 
while other scholars stress the need for efficient and accurate investigations 
                                                          
 17. See infra Part V (concluding that a judicially-created DNA exception is a viable 
way to balance the interests of victims and defendants in New Hampshire). 
 18. See Diehl, supra note 6, at 433 (noting that many of the goals statutes of 
limitations seek to accomplish can be achieved through other methods). 
 19. See Amy Dunn, Note, Statutes of Limitation on Sexual Assault Crimes: Has the 
Availability of DNA Evidence Rendered Them Obsolete?, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. 
REV. 839, 844-846 (2001) (suggesting that statute of limitations systems are policy 
decisions rather than strictly legal decisions). 
 20. See Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of 
Limitation, 28 PAC. L. J. 453, 462 (1997) (recognizing that witnesses who do not want to 
testify may gain peace of mind from the presence of limitation schemes). 
 21. See Dunn, supra note 19, at 846 (arguing that statutes of limitations protect the 
innocent, including third parties). 
 22. See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 20, at 471 (explaining that avoiding 
deterioration of evidence serves four distinct purposes: “to ensure accuracy in fact-
finding[,] . . . to prevent the assertion of fraudulent claim[,]s . . . to reduce the costs of 
litigation[,] . . .  and . . . to preserve the integrity of the legal system”). 
 23. See id. at 472, 474-75 (considering several rationales for statutes of limitations 
before concluding that, above all, they encourage accurate fact-finding). 
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to avoid false convictions.24 
A case that paved the way for a DNA tolling provision in New York is 
People v. Martinez.25  In that case, the court warmly embraced the use of 
DNA testing to identify potential defendants.26  The defendant was identified 
in the indictment solely by his unique DNA profile.27  The court held that the 
“John Doe” warrant was legally sufficient to indict him.28  This endorsement 
of using DNA databanks to identify perpetrators, via John Doe warrants, also 
informed the court’s willingness to toll statutes of limitations for untested 
DNA samples in rape kits.29 
In 2006, the New York state legislature amended their criminal code to 
abolish the statute of limitations for some sex crimes, including rape in the 
first degree, first degree sexual abuse, and sexual conduct against a child.30  
Prior to the adoption of the 2006 amendment, the New York courts created 
an exception that allowed the statute of limitations to toll when the identity 
of the defendant depended on DNA evidence.31  For offenses subject to the 
statute of limitations, language in the New York statute allows the limitation 
period to toll for any length of time “during which . . . the whereabouts of 
the defendant were continuously unknown and continuously ascertainable 
                                                          
 24. Compare id. at 482-83 (criticizing the use of judicial convenience as a rationale 
for statutes of limitations) with Dunn, supra note 19, at 844 (arguing that “the imposition 
of statutes of limitations on certain crimes reduces the probability of errors in 
conviction.”). 
 25. See People v. Martinez, 855 N.Y.S.2d 522, 525 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) 
(considering the validity of a “John Doe” indictment that was accompanied by a specific 
DNA profile). 
 26. See id. at 526 (noting that the “prevalence of DNA databanks as a criminal justice 
tool supports the conclusion that a defendant can be properly identified by a DNA 
profile”). 
 27. See id. at 523-24 (explaining that the DNA sample was generated from the rape 
kit collected after the 1996 rape, the John Doe warrant was issued in 2001, and the 
defendant’s DNA matched the sample from the John Doe indictment in 2004). 
 28. See id. at 525 (holding that the defendant’s right to notice was satisfied when he 
was given a copy of the indictment, which accurately identified him by his DNA sample). 
 29. See People v. Guerrero, 3 N.Y.S.3d 600, 614 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (stating that 
using a DNA warrant in a case, which also employed tolling, was proper). 
 30. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10 (2)(a) (McKinney 2014) (listing other sexual 
crimes included in the list of exceptions to the statute of limitations); see also People v. 
Burroughs, 968 N.Y.S.2d 773, 776 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (applying the statutory 
amendment retroactively to offenses that were not yet time-barred, due to the statute of 
limitations, at the time of the amendment). 
 31. See People v. Harrison, 803 N.Y.S.2d 5, 6-7 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (holding that 
the first-degree rape charge was not time-barred because of the state’s inability to identify 
a suspect without the use of DNA evidence). 
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through by the exercise of reasonable diligence.”32  Even with this language, 
the statute may only be extended for five additional years.33 
The court interpreted the language from this statutory tolling provision in 
People v. Burroughs.34  In that case, although the state made the same 
argument that was successful in Seda and Bradberry, the court rejected the 
state’s position.35  Because the crime in question was committed before the 
statute of limitations was abolished in New York, the court looked at the case 
through the lens of the tolling provision in § 30.10 of the New York Criminal 
Code.36  After determining the tolling provision of the statute did not apply, 
the court concluded that the use of reasonable diligence would likely have 
resulted in the identification of the defendant as a suspect in the rape because 
his DNA profile had been in New York’s databank since 1998.37  Even after 
the defendant’s DNA generated a match in the databank in 2003, the police 
waited two more years before arresting him.38  Because the police neglected 
to test a DNA sample which already existed in the state database, the court 
concluded that the defendant’s identity had not been “unknown . . . through 
the exercise of reasonable diligence.”39  The reasoning in Burroughs suggests 
                                                          
 32. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10(4)(a)(ii) (McKinney 2014) (providing an 
additional tolling exception for the period the defendant was continuously located outside 
of New York). 
 33. See People v. Seda, 712 N.E.2d 682, 685-86 (N.Y. 1999) (noting that the tolling 
statute was passed to balance the constitutional right of defendants to a speedy trial with 
the need of sufficient time for law enforcement to fully investigate difficult cases). 
 34. See Burroughs, 968 N.Y.S.2d at 777 (stating that once a defendant’s DNA is 
entered into a databank, reasonable diligence should allow investigators to discover his 
identity). 
 35. Compare Seda, 712 N.E.2d at 685 (holding that if investigators cannot determine 
a defendant’s identity with the use of reasonable diligence, the statute of limitations tolls 
until his identity is discovered) and People v. Bradberry, 891 N.Y.S.2d 850, 851-52 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (deciding that a defendant’s unknown identity tolls the statute of 
limitations until a DNA sample is tested) with Burroughs, 968 N.Y.S.2d at 777 (reversing 
part of a defendant’s rape conviction because his DNA profile was entered into a 
statewide database prior to his arrest, but after the statute of limitations had passed). 
 36. See § 30.10(4)(a) (declaring the tolling provision of the law, as amended in 
2006); Burroughs, 968 N.Y.S.2d at 776 (noting that the statute of limitations for rape at 
the time of the indictment was five years, but because the charge was not yet time-barred, 
the 2006 amendment applied retroactively to the case). 
 37. See Burroughs, 968 N.Y.S.2d at 776-7 (explaining the relationship between the 
facts of the case and the procedural timeline). 
 38. See id. at 775-76 (stating that it was unclear from the record why there was a 
large gap in time between the DNA bank match and the indictment’s filing). 
 39. See id. at 777 (finding that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the tolling provision applied in this case). 
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that if untested evidence had prevented investigators from identifying the 
defendant, the state’s argument may have prevailed. 
The existence of a tolling exception for cases with untested DNA samples 
is evident in New York common law prior to the passage of the 2006 
amendment to the statute of limitations.40  In a collection of relatively short 
opinions the court repeatedly affirmed that when a previously untested DNA 
sample is tested and the result leads to the identification and conviction of a 
defendant, the statute of limitations is tolled for the time period the sample 
remained untested.41  Although the statute of limitations for sexual offenses 
no longer exists in New York, if a prosecution was time-barred at the time 
of the amendment, the statute still applies.42  Consequently, there are several 
post-2006 cases that deal with the DNA exception.43 
Prior to the legislature’s abolishing the statute of limitations for sexual 
offenses, the New York courts created a common-law DNA exception based 
largely on the idea that the defendant’s identity was unknowable while DNA 
evidence remained untested.44  One case interpreting this exception is People 
v. Bradberry.45  In Bradberry, the victim, who was raped by a stranger in 
1997, did not have her rape kit processed until 2004.46  No match was found 
                                                          
 40. See Seda, 712 N.E.2d at 685 (tolling the statute of limitations for murder until 
police could discover the defendant’s identity through DNA testing). 
 41. See People v. Brown, 918 N.E.2d 927, 932-33 (N.Y. 2009) (holding a statute of 
limitations defense meritless because there was no evidence that the police could have 
identified the defendant prior to the DNA match); see also People v. Lloyd, 805 N.Y.S.2d 
20, 21 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (determining that police acted with reasonable diligence 
even though the defendant was unable to be identified until a DNA match led to a “cold 
case” hit); People v. Grogan, 816 N.Y.S.2d 93, 95 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (deciding the 
statute tolled for the eight-year delay between the rape and the defendant’s indictment), 
abrogated by People v. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 2008); People v. Sigl, 967 
N.Y.S.2d 570, 571 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (establishing that the defendant’s identity and 
whereabouts were not ascertainable until his DNA profile was matched with DNA 
obtained from an unrelated crime). 
 42. See Burroughs, 968 N.Y.S.2d at 776 (applying the 2006 amendment 
retroactively only for crimes that the statute of limitations had not yet time-barred). 
 43. See id. (noting the legislature’s reasoning for abolishing the statute of 
limitations); see also Sigl, 967 N.Y.S.2d at 571 (affirming the lower court’s tolling of the 
statute of limitations for a sodomy conviction). 
 44. See Sigl, 967 N.Y.S.2d at 571-72 (explaining the connection between the 
knowledge of a defendant’s whereabouts and the knowledge of his identity). 
 45. See People v. Bradberry, 891 N.Y.S.2d 850, 852-53 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) 
(holding that the defendant’s identity was unknown while the state did not possess a 
DNA sample from him). 
 46. See id. at 851 (detailing how a grant received by the county in 2004 to test 
unprocessed DNA evidence led to the testing of the victim’s evidence in this case). 
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in the Combined DNA Index System (hereinafter “CODIS”) until 2005, 
when the defendant’s DNA was entered into the system for an unrelated 
crime.47  Bradberry demonstrates that even when DNA evidence in a rape 
kit is tested, the statute may still toll if there is no ability to prosecute the 
perpetrator because no matches have been found in the CODIS.48 
The prevailing reason for New York’s DNA exception is that the 
defendant’s whereabouts cannot be known without his identity being known, 
which in turn is unascertainable without the use of DNA evidence.49  This 
exception is especially important in rape cases, which are likely to have an 
unknown attacker and recovered DNA evidence.50  “John Doe” indictments 
and warrants, or indictments and warrants issued against specific DNA 
profiles under fictitious names, have been a widely-touted solution for rape 
cases with unknown assailants that are running out of time under statutes of 
limitations.51  These indictments are recognized in the state of New York as 
valid indictments that terminate the statute of limitations when filed.52  
However, DNA warrants and indictments run into trouble in cases where 
rape kit backlogs have prevented DNA samples from being tested.53  DNA 
exceptions fill the gap that is created when an untested DNA sample exists 
and the assailant is unknown to the victim.54 
By contrast, the New Hampshire statute of limitations does not contain 
                                                          
 47. See id. at 852 (affirming the defendant’s conviction because the crime could not 
be prosecuted until a DNA sample match was found). 
 48. See id. (holding the prosecution timely given the five-year period of limitation, 
added to the five-year extension, under the tolling statute); see also People v. Martinez, 
855 N.Y.S.2d 522, 535-36 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (reasoning that a John Doe warrant 
indicting a defendant based solely on a DNA sample was appropriate due to the certainty 
with which DNA can identify a person). 
 49. See People v. Seda, 712 N.E.2d 682, 685 (N.Y. 1999) (interpreting, in the context 
of a murder case, the defendant’s whereabouts to include his identity because police 
cannot discover the former without knowing the latter). 
 50. See Kearns, supra note 7, at 346 (asserting that roughly thirty percent of rape 
victims do not know their attackers). 
 51. See id. at 346-47 (explaining that John Doe warrants enable investigators to 
continue investigations without time constraints). 
 52. See Martinez, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 524-25 (holding that because indictments may 
refer to a defendant in any manner sufficient to identify them, John Doe indictments give 
defendants sufficient notice). 
 53. Veronica Valdivieso, Note, DNA Warrants: A Panacea for Old, Cold Rape 
Cases?, 90 GEO. L.J. 1009, 1025 (2002) (arguing that the backlog of untested DNA 
samples hinder the issuance of John Doe warrants). 
 54. See People v. Bradberry, 891 N.Y.S.2d 850, 851 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (holding 
the DNA tolling exception appropriate where the defendant never saw her assailant’s 
face and her rape was not processed until years later). 
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any kind of DNA tolling exception.55  Under New Hampshire law, the statute 
of limitations for the prosecution of felonies is six years.56  The statutory 
language of the New Hampshire statute is less robust than the language in 
New York, but the New Hampshire statute does toll “during any time when 
the accused is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably 
ascertainable place of abode or work within [New Hampshire].”57  However, 
there is nothing in either the New Hampshire statute or in that state’s case 
law that allows the limitations period to toll while an untested rape kit 
prevents the discovery of a defendant’s identity.58  This leaves victims of 
sexual assault with few legal options should the state fail to identify their 
attackers before the statutory period runs out.  New Hampshire has put some 
protections in place for elderly victims and victims who are children by 
giving them the statutory right to a speedy trial, but adult victims are not 
similarly protected.59 New York’s DNA exception offers protection to adult 
victims of sexual assault, and does not infringe on defendants’ right to a 
speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment.60  It is therefore a model which 
should be followed by similarly situated jurisdictions. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. New Hampshire Should Follow New York’s Jurisprudence Regarding 
DNA Tolling Exceptions Because Tolling Sexual Assault Statutes Do Not 
Violate Defendants’ Due Process Rights 
The New York courts have held that tolling the statute of limitations in 
rape cases does not abridge the due process rights of defendants.61  
                                                          
 55. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:8 (providing the circumstances under which the 
statute of limitations may toll). 
 56. See § 625:8(I)(c) (setting the limitation period for misdemeanors at one year). 
 57. See id. (tolling the statute of limitations if any other prosecution for the same 
conduct is currently pending against the defendant). 
 58. See id. 
 59. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:9 (extending the right to a speedy trial to 
certain victims of sexual assault or rape). 
 60. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (extending the right to those accused of crimes). 
Compare People v. Singer, 376 N.E.2d 179, 186 (N.Y. 1978) (specifying that unjustified 
delays in commencing prosecution violate a defendant’s due process rights and require 
dismissal of the case) with People v. Bradberry, 891 N.Y.S.2d 850, 853 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2009) (holding that a prosecutorial delay due to a lack of knowledge about the 
defendant’s identity was justified and did not violate the defendant’s right to a speedy 
trial). 
 61. See Singer, 376 N.E.2d at 186 (noting that where there has been a delay in 
commencing a prosecution, the state has the burden of showing good cause for the delay). 
9
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Provisions that toll the statute of limitations in other types of cases have also 
been held to be lawful.62  Under the New York statutory tolling provision, 
for example, such defendants are subject to prosecution if they fled the 
jurisdiction for the statutory period and then returned.63  Courts have held 
that these provisions do not interfere with defendants’ due process rights 
because they do not affect the defendant’s ability to put on a defense.64  
Additionally, the state has a strong interest in prosecuting perpetrators in 
cases where DNA evidence is discovered after the statute of limitations has 
expired.65 
By creating a DNA tolling exception, New York’s jurisprudence 
recognizes the importance of DNA evidence for prosecuting cases that 
involve stranger rape.66  If the victim does not know her attacker, it is 
possible that DNA may be the only evidence connecting the perpetrator to 
the crime, which can be preserved in a rape kit.67  Harrison illustrates that in 
these cases, proof consisting entirely, or almost entirely, of DNA evidence 
is sufficient to convict a perpetrator.68  By failing to toll the statute of 
                                                          
 62. See People v. Knobel, 723 N.E.2d 550, 552 (N.Y. 1999) (finding that the statute 
of limitations was appropriately tolled while the defendant was located outside the state); 
see also State v. Nadler, 855 A.2d 490, 493 (N.H. 2004) (holding that the statute of 
limitations appropriately tolled during a thirty-six-year delay between commission of the 
crime and prosecution because none of the delay was attributable to the state). 
 63. See Knobel, 723 N.E.2d at 552 (deciding that a defendant’s absence from the 
state does not need to be a single uninterrupted period of time, but rather, “all periods of 
a day or more that a nonresident defendant is out-of-State should be totaled and toll the 
Statute of Limitations”). 
 64. See Bradberry, 891 N.Y.S.2d at 852 (considering five factors when determining 
whether a delayed prosecution has violated a defendant’s right to a speedy trial: “(1) the 
extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; 
(4) whether or not there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) 
whether or not there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the 
delay”). 
 65. See People v. Martinez, 855 N.Y.S.2d 522, 525 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (praising 
the efficacy and accuracy of DNA analysis in identifying suspects). 
 66. See id. (concluding that the indictment of a defendant identified solely by his 
DNA match is appropriate due to DNA testing’s high level of reliability); see also Milli 
Kanani Hansen, Note, Testing Justice: Prospects for Constitutional Claims by Victims 
Whose Rape Kits Remain Untested, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 943, 948 (2011) 
(arguing that in addition to gaining widespread acceptance in nearly every court, DNA 
evidence is a particularly effective tool for solving sexual assault cases). 
 67. See Hansen, supra note 66, at 948 (contrasting the high efficacy of DNA 
evidence with the huge number of rape kits that remain untested across the country). 
 68. See People v. Harrison, 803 N.Y.S.2d 5, 6 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (holding that 
because DNA evidence established the defendant’s identity beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the evidence was legally sufficient to convict him). 
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limitations while rape kits remain untested, New Hampshire is depriving its 
law enforcement of a powerful investigative tool.69 
New Hampshire is also failing to act in accordance with the purpose of 
statutory limitations on prosecutions.70  While statutes of limitations serve 
important interests, multiple circumstances exist that make tolling 
exceptions appropriate.71  Jurisdictions have codified different rationales for 
tolling exceptions, but the most common rationales include: defendants 
fleeing the jurisdiction, defendants concealing the crime or committing the 
crime in secret, defendant’s identity being unknown, or the crime being part 
of a continuing course of criminal conduct.72  As interpreted by New York 
courts, the DNA exception is closely related to the unknown defendant 
exception.73  The idea that “[d]efendants who are benefiting from an 
opportunity to avoid facing criminal charges should not be permitted to avail 
themselves of that advantage in order to derail an otherwise timely 
prosecution” is doubly relevant when dealing with crimes as notoriously 
difficult to prosecute as sexual assaults.74  New York, by properly tolling the 
statute of limitations, is preventing sexual offenders from benefitting from 
                                                          
 69. See Hansen, supra note 66, at 951 (noting that by using grant money to address 
its rape kit backlog, the city of St. Louis was able to match twenty DNA samples from 
kits to people who had previously been convicted of crimes). 
 70. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971) (finding that statutes of 
limitations create an “irrefutable presumption that a defendant’s right to a fair trial would 
be prejudiced”). 
 71. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10(2)(a) (McKinney 2014) (explaining the 
circumstances under which the statute of limitations toll in New York); see also State v. 
Nadler, 855 A.2d 490, 493 (N.H. 2004) (finding tolling appropriate when the victim did 
not report the crime to authorities for over thirty years after being disbelieved by his 
parents). 
 72. See The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law: A Penetrable Barrier to 
Prosecution, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 639, 641-46 (1954) [hereinafter “Penetrable 
Barrier”] (explaining the most common reasons for both enacting and tolling statutes of 
limitations for various types of crimes). 
 73. See People v. Sigl, 967 N.Y.S.2d 570, 571 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (affirming that 
the police used diligent efforts, but could not determine the defendant’s identity without 
a DNA match); see also People v. Seda, 712 N.E.2d 682, 685 (N.Y. 1999) (determining 
that knowledge of a defendant’s identity is a necessary prerequisite to knowing his 
whereabouts). But see People v. Burroughs, 968 N.Y.S.2d 773, 777 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2013) (refusing to toll the statute of limitations when there was evidence that the police 
could have identified the defendant sooner if they had used reasonable diligence). 
 74. See Hansen, supra note 66, at 946 (arguing that rape cases are difficult to 
prosecute without DNA evidence because of DNA’s highly probative nature and the fact 
that DNA may be the only evidence that a sexual offense occurred). 
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such an advantage.75  In contrast, New Hampshire’s improper interpretation 
of its tolling statute illustrates a misunderstanding of the purpose of repose 
and allows sexual offenders, a large percentage of whom are multiple 
offenders, to avoid criminal charges.76 
Like the tolling provisions enumerated in statutory language, New York’s 
DNA exception does not offend defendants’ due process rights.77  To clarify, 
New York and New Hampshire both have provisions for tolling statutes of 
limitations in certain circumstances.78  While the DNA exception is not 
actually enumerated in the New York statute, the courts have interpreted the 
“unknown whereabouts provision” in a way that incorporates the 
exception.79  The New Hampshire statute contains similar language to the 
New York tolling provision.80  New Hampshire should follow New York’s 
reasoning in Seda and interpret the tolling provision, which already allows 
for tolling while a defendant’s workplace or abode cannot be ascertained, to 
also include tolling for cases where a rape kit remained untested until the 
statutory period had expired.81  As the New York court reasoned in Seda, a 
                                                          
 75. See People v. Bradberry, 891 N.Y.S.2d 850, 851-853 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) 
(tolling the statute of limitations, even though the statutory period had passed, because 
the police could not identify the defendant); see also People v. Brown, 918 N.E.2d 927, 
932-933 (N.Y. 2009) (finding that because police never had access to the additional 
description of the attacker, which the victim offered at trial, there was no possibility that 
the defendant’s identity could have been discovered more quickly); see also Hansen, 
supra note 66, at 946 (asserting that in one study of rapists who went undetected, sixty-
three percent were serial rapists). 
 76. See Hansen, supra note 66, at 946 (observing that backlogs in testing rape kits 
provide rapists enough time to offend repeatedly without detection). 
 77. See People v. Guerrero, 126 A.D.3d 613, 614 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (concluding 
that a thirteen-year delay in prosecuting rape and sodomy charges due to a lack of DNA 
evidence did not violate defendant’s right to due process). 
 78. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10 (McKinney 2014) (providing limitation 
periods and conditions for tolling); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:8 (2014) (providing 
limitation periods and conditions for tolling). 
 79. See People v. Harrison, 803 N.Y.S.2d 5, 6 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (holding that 
a defendant charged with sexual assault was unidentifiable until technology made it 
possible for the state to identify him through a DNA match); see also People v. Seda, 
712 N.E.2d 682, 685 (N.Y. 1999) (finding that if a defendant’s identity cannot be 
ascertained, neither can his whereabouts). 
 80. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10 (tolling the limitation period when the 
whereabouts of a defendant are unknown); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:8 
(tolling limitation period when the defendant’s abode or workplace cannot be ascertained 
through reasonable diligence). 
 81. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:8 (allowing for tolling when the defendant is 
continuously out of state); see also Seda, 712 N.E.2d at 685 (connecting the difficulty of 
finding a suspect’s location to the difficulty of finding the suspect’s identity); State v. 
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defendant’s whereabouts are likely unascertainable through reasonable 
diligence until his identity is known.82  Because a defendant’s place of work 
or abode is analogous to his whereabouts, the New Hampshire statute leaves 
ample room for an interpretation that would allow for a DNA tolling 
exception.83  By failing to incorporate such a provision, the New Hampshire 
courts are improperly interpreting the state’s own tolling statute.84 
 
B. A Judicially-Created DNA Tolling Exception in New Hampshire Would 
Provide Victims of Sexual Assault with the Possibility of Legal Recourse 
While Protecting the Due Process Rights of Defendants 
The New Hampshire legislature has already expressed an interest in the 
rights of victims.85  The “speedy trial” provision of the criminal code chapter 
dealing with sex offenses extended the right to a speedy trial to very young 
and elderly victims.86  While New Hampshire has no cases interpreting the 
statute, the language suggests that the legislature was aware of the emotional 
toll that participating in a rape prosecution has on victims.87  It therefore 
                                                          
Nadler, 855 A.2d 490, 493 (2004) (holding that even if a lengthy delay is caused by a 
victim, as long as the delay cannot be attributed to the state, the delay is not unreasonable 
or arbitrary and tolling is therefore appropriate). 
 82. See Seda, 712 N.E.2d at 684 (noting that this interpretation of the statutory 
language is straightforward and in line with the statute’s legislative purpose). 
 83. See People v. Lloyd, 805 N.Y.S 20, 21 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (reasoning that 
the defendant’s whereabouts were unknown until advances in DNA technology made it 
possible to make a DNA match); see also Kearns, supra note 7, at 343 (suggesting that 
the residency tolling provisions are a result of the difficulty faced by law enforcement in 
identifying suspects who are located outside of the state). 
 84. See People v. Sigl, 967 N.Y.S.2d 570, 571 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (holding that 
the defendant’s identity could not be ascertained before the state was able to match his 
DNA, collected after the rape, with another sample that was collected for an unrelated 
crime); see also Seda, 712 N.E.2d at 683-84 (rejecting the argument that the term 
‘whereabouts’ only refers to a person’s physical location, and instead interpreting the 
term as including both the defendant’s location and identity). Compare N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 625:8 (containing a provision that tolls the statute of limitations when a person’s 
abode or workplace cannot be ascertained) with N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10(4)(a)(ii) 
(tolling the statute of limitations while the defendant’s whereabouts remain unknown). 
 85. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:9 (extending the right to a speedy trial to 
certain victims of sexual assault or rape). 
 86. See id. (requiring the court to consider any possible adverse impact on certain 
victims or witnesses before granting a motion for a delay or a continuance of court 
proceedings). 
 87. See id. (expressing a desire to protect minors and elderly victims from “the stress 
involved in the proceeding”). 
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established the right to a speedy trial for particularly vulnerable classes of 
victims.88  While many reasons exist to afford minors and people over the 
age of sixty-five with special protections, the stress and possibility of trauma 
associated with trial are no less relevant for victims between the ages of 
sixteen and sixty-five.89  If the right to a speedy trial is not expressly extended 
to the latter class of victims, a DNA exception could provide similar 
protection.90  A victim who does not know her attacker cannot reasonably 
ascertain his identity until her rape kit is tested, which may not happen until 
after the statutory period has expired due to rape kit backlogs throughout the 
United States.91  Accordingly, the state cannot begin prosecution until the 
rape kit has been tested, thus the speediest possible trial in this situation 
depends on the test date of the kit.92  New Hampshire has already 
demonstrated a concern for speedy trials in certain rape cases, and a 
judicially-created DNA tolling exception would also provide protection for 
adult victims by allowing them to see their cases prosecuted as soon as 
possible.93 
Prosecutions brought after a statute of limitations has been tolled do not 
violate defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.94  The United 
States Supreme Court held in United States v. Marion that the right to a 
                                                          
 88. See id. (limiting the right to victims under the age of sixteen and over the age of 
sixty-five). 
 89. See Daly, supra note 1, at 20 (suggesting that the unique nature of rape, combined 
with the increased societal stigma surrounding rape victims, results in greater and longer-
lasting emotional impacts). 
 90. See id. at 21 (explaining the important role DNA plays in identifying perpetrators 
of stranger rape); see also People v. Guerrero, 126 A.D.3d 613, 614 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2015) 
(noting that the trial could not have been commenced sooner because the defendant’s 
identity was unknown, and therefore the delay did not violate the defendant’s due process 
rights). 
 91. See People v. Brown, 918 N.E.2d 927, 928-29 (N.Y. 2009) (holding that the 
statute of limitations was properly tolled for roughly nine-years because the victim’s rape 
kit went untested due to backlog). 
 92. See id. at 929 (recognizing that prosecution could not begin until law 
enforcement found a DNA match in CODIS several months after the kit was tested). 
 93. See People v. Seda, 712 N.E.2d 682, 685 (N.Y. 1999) (commenting that using 
the tolling exception for cases with unknown defendants “balance[s] the general policy 
in favor of avoiding prosecution of stale cases against the countervailing policy of 
ensuring that law enforcement officers have sufficient time to bring suspected criminals 
to justice”). 
 94. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971) (holding that the 
defendants did not become “accused” until they were indicted, and therefore a three-year 
period between the commission of the offense and the indictment did not infringe on 
their Sixth Amendment rights). 
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speedy trial does not attach until a person becomes “accused.”95  While a 
period of, potentially, many years between the commission of a sexual 
offense and the state’s ability to prosecute the offense may make it more 
difficult for the defendant to mount a defense, his rights under the Sixth 
Amendment cannot be infringed upon before they attach to him.96  Under the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Marion, those rights do not attach until the 
defendant is arrested or charged.97  Sexual offenses where the defendant can 
only be identified after the state obtains a DNA match from a rape kit often 
result in a long period of delay between the commission of the offense and 
even the possibility of an arrest.98  Through statutes of limitations, states 
impose their own time limit on when a prosecution may be brought; 
however, these limitations are state creations and have nothing to do with 
whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has attached.99  Accordingly, 
states can, and do, create exceptions that allow prosecutions to occur outside 
of the statute of limitations period.100  Therefore, New Hampshire can 
introduce an exception that tolls the statute of limitations in cases that cannot 
proceed without a tested rape kit without abridging the Sixth Amendment 
rights of defendants.101 
While statutes of limitations play an important role in protecting 
defendants from pre-accusation delay, a DNA tolling exception does not 
                                                          
 95. See id. at 320 (noting that the purpose of the speedy trial clause is to prevent the 
lengthy detainment of accused defendants). 
 96. See id. (distinguishing between the possibility of prejudice and actual prejudice 
suffered from an inordinate delay in a defendant’s case). 
 97. See id. at 321 (explaining that prior to a defendant’s arrest, there are no 
constraints on a person’s liberty that require the protection of the Sixth Amendment). 
 98. See People v. Bradberry, 891 N.Y.S.2d 850, 852 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (finding 
that the inability of police to find a match to the defendant’s DNA until the defendant 
was convicted of another, unrelated crime was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations 
for five years). 
 99. See Marion, 404 U.S. at 322 (observing that statutes of limitations balance the 
interests of the state in prosecuting crime with the need for repose for those who may be 
prosecuted). 
 100. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:8(VI) (2014) (tolling the statute of 
limitations while the accused’s identity is unknown or while another prosecution or the 
same conduct is pending against the accused). 
 101. See People v. Guerrero, 3 N.Y.S. 600, 614 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (holding that 
the defendant’s right to a speedy trial had not been abridged because he was unable to 
show any actual prejudice); see also Hansen, supra note 66, at 960-61 (illustrating that 
the response to rape kit backlogs may negatively impact the rights of criminal defendants 
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unfairly expose defendants to undue delay.102  DNA tolling exceptions are 
crafted narrowly enough to address the specific problems facing prosecution 
delays due to rape kit backlogs.103  As the New York court pointed out in 
Brown, there was little to no possibility that police would be able to identify 
an unknown assailant until a rape kit was tested and a DNA match was 
found.104  That case involved a ten-year delay between the assault and 
prosecution, which is unquestionably a substantial period of time.105  
However, as the court pointed out, no evidence that the state uncovered made 
it more likely that the state could have discovered the defendant’s identity 
any sooner.106  This kind of delay is exactly what the tolling exception 
contemplates, and the exception only covers the types of situations found in 
Brown.107  Such a narrowly drawn line is unlikely to lead to a slippery slope 
that does away with statutes of limitations altogether or allows for anyone to 
be accused of a sexual offense at any time.108  Instead, New York’s exception 
preserves the ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations while also preventing 
unavoidable delays from hindering prosecution.109 
                                                          
 102. See Kearns, supra note 7, at 358 (arguing that eliminating the statutes of 
limitations for sex crimes will inevitably lead to the elimination of statutes of limitations 
for all types of crime). 
 103. See Bradberry, 891 N.Y.S.2d at 852 (finding that despite a delay, the state 
commenced prosecution as soon as it was reasonably able to do so); see also People v. 
Brown, 918 N.E.2d 927, 928-29 (N.Y. 2009) (noting that the delay of nine years between 
the commission of the crime and the testing of the rape kit testing was due to a backlog 
of rape kits). 
 104. See Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 932 (considering whether an additional physical 
description of her attacker, given by the victim at trial, would have led to an earlier 
identification of the defendant). 
 105. See id. at 929 (explaining that the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner did not 
receive funding to address the rape kit backlog until nearly nine years after the 
commission of the original offense). 
 106. See id. (concluding that despite the delay in prosecution, the police used all 
reasonable diligence to investigate the crime); see also People v. Sigl, 967 N.Y.S.2d 570, 
571-72 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (affirming that the defendant’s identity could not have 
been reasonably ascertained by the police prior to a DNA match being found). 
 107. See Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 932-33 (applying only a limited five-year extension 
when tolling the statute of limitations); see also State v. Nadler, 855 A.2d 490, 493 
(2004) (noting that the State did not delay pursuing prosecution once the victim reported 
the crime). 
 108. See Kearns, supra note 7, at 358 (discussing the potential dangers of repealing 
all statutes of limitations on sex crimes). But see S.B. 98, 165th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. 
(N.H. 2017) (proposing a bill that would completely eliminate statutory limitation 
periods for sexual assault and incest crimes). 
 109. See People v. Seda, 712 N.E.2d 682, 685 (N.Y. 1999) (holding that, for the 
purposes of New York’s statutory tolling provision, a defendant’s whereabouts cannot 
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The introduction of a DNA exception in New Hampshire that is similar to 
the one used by New York courts would not infringe on defendants’ due 
process rights.110  The test in New Hampshire for deciding whether due 
process requirements were met is to determine whether the defendant has 
been subjected to “overly stale” charges.111  For instance, while the court 
charged the defendant in Ramos within the required statutory period, the 
court also considered whether the defendant had been prejudiced by any 
delays caused by the state.112  A DNA tolling exception would not infringe 
on defendants’ due process rights because the defendants would not be 
prejudiced by the delay.113  As the New York court noted in Brown, the state 
had no evidence to bring charges against the defendant earlier because the 
backlog of rape kits made it impossible to test the victim’s kit sooner.114  The 
state’s actions did not cause the defendant’s case turn out differently, they 
just caused the case to be decided later; therefore, the defendant suffered no 
prejudice and no due process violation occurred.115 
Additionally, the second prong of New Hampshire’s due process test, the 
reasonableness of the delay, is easily satisfied using the New York courts’ 
reasoning.116  In cases where the inability to test a rape kit has led to 
                                                          
be ascertained while his identity remains unknown); see also United States v. Marion, 
404 U.S. 307, 323 (1971) (observing that the purpose of statutes of limitations is to 
provide predictability and repose for people who may face criminal charges and to 
encourage the police to investigate crimes promptly). 
 110. See State v. Ramos, 553 A.2d 275, 282 (N.H. 1988) (noting that defendants must 
also show that they were actually prejudiced by the delay in prosecution, and the 
defendant in that case failed to do so). 
 111. See id. (stating that charges are presumed to be timely if it is brought within the 
statutory period). 
 112. See id. (balancing the prejudice against the defendant with the reasons for the 
state’s delay). 
 113. See People v. Guerrero, 126 A.D.3d 613, 614 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (holding 
that the defendant was not prejudiced by a 13-year delay because his guilt would have 
been established earlier with DNA evidence). 
 114. See People v. Brown, 918 N.E.2d 927, 932 (N.Y. 2009) (rejecting the 
defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim because there was no evidence that 
the police could have identified the defendant before the victim’s rape kit was tested, and 
as a result the statute of limitations defense the defendant wished to raise was meritless). 
 115. See Ramos, 553 A.2d at 282-83 (upholding the trial court’s ruling that there was 
insufficient evidence to establish that the state’s delay in arresting the defendant had 
caused the defendant actual prejudice); see also State v. Hamel, 643 A.2d 953, 956 (N.H. 
1994) (finding that an extension of the statute of limitations for sexual offenses against 
minors did not prejudice the defendant or affect his substantive rights). 
 116. See Ramos, 553 A.2d at 279 (stating that if the defendant can establish that actual 
prejudice resulted from a prosecutorial delay, then the court must “balance the resulting 
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prosecutorial delay, the New York court has consistently held that so long as 
law enforcement took all reasonable investigatory steps in the meantime, the 
delay is reasonable.117  By applying this reasoning to similarly situated cases 
in New Hampshire and tolling the statute of limitations until rape kits can be 
tested, New Hampshire can balance the needs of investigators with the needs 
of defendants.118  In Ramos, the delay was negligible because the prosecution 
was brought well within the statutory period.119  However, the court still 
considered whether the small delay was caused by mistakes made by the 
prosecutor, and ultimately found that not to be the case.120  Tolling the statute 
of limitations for sexual crimes that can only be prosecuted with the use of 
backlogged DNA evidence would allow the state to bring prosecutions 
within the statutory period.121  Because any delay caused by the backlog is 
not caused by the prosecutors’ actions, tolling is not unreasonable, does not 
prejudice the defendant, and does not result in a due process violation.122 
By introducing a DNA tolling provision, New Hampshire would give 
victims with untested kits a measure of relief that they would not receive 
otherwise.123  Compared to defendants, victims of crimes have few 
                                                          
prejudice against the reasonableness of the delay”). 
 117. See People v. Sigl, 967 N.Y.S.2d 570, 571-72 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (finding 
that a delay in prosecution for rape was reasonable when the state could not identify the 
defendant until it obtained a DNA match); see also People v. Ramos, 921 N.E.2d 598, 
599 (N.Y. 2009) (tolling the statute of limitations  for ten years while the defendant’s 
DNA sample from the victim’s rape kit went unmatched); People v. Harrison, 803 
N.Y.S.2d 5, 6-7 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (holding that a delay in prosecution for rape due 
to the state’s inability to test DNA evidence was reasonable). 
 118. See People v. Bradberry, 891 N.Y.S.2d 850, 851-53 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) 
(applying a balancing test and concluding that although the defendant suffered a lengthy 
delay, his right to a speedy trial was not infringed upon). 
 119. State v. Ramos, 553 A.2d at 278 (finding that a seven-month delay between the 
commission of the offense and the defendant’s arrest was well within the six-year statute 
of limitations for the offense and did not prejudice the defendant). 
 120. See id. at 279 (stating that the court must consider the reasonableness of, and 
reasons for, a delay in prosecution); see also State v. Nadler, 855 A.2d 490, 493 (N.H. 
2004) (finding that so long as the delay in prosecution is not attributable to the actions 
of the state, the delay is not unreasonable and thus does not prejudice the defendant). 
 121. See Harrison, 803 N.Y.S.2d at 6-7 (holding that when a suspect could not be 
identified without DNA evidence, the statute of limitations for rape was properly tolled). 
 122. See Kearns, supra note 7, at 348-49 (noting that because the burden of proof to 
establish tolling is generally on the state, innocent defendants are protected from endless 
limitation periods). 
 123. See Hansen, supra note 66, at 960-62 (examining the effects of rape kit backlogs 
on statute of limitations legislation in various jurisdictions). 
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protections and limited access to the court system.124  While the victim of a 
sexual assault clearly has a substantial interest in having her rape kit tested, 
a match found, and her assailant prosecuted, there are few, if any, legal 
avenues available for victims to seek relief if a defendant is not prosecuted.125  
While bringing a claim under Section 1983 is theoretically possible, two 
substantial hurdles must be cleared first: the presence of a state action and 
immunity doctrines.126  In the absence of an adequate statutory scheme, such 
as a “victim bill of rights” that grants the victim a cause of action, 
constitutional claims by victims with untested kits are likely to fail, or at least 
be exceedingly difficult to litigate.127  Without such a scheme in place, one 
way that New Hampshire can protect the interests of victims is by 
implementing a DNA tolling exception for sexual offense cases.128 
Although some commentators have suggested that victims with untested 
kits can make a viable Equal Protection Clause claim against a state for not 
testing their kits, this claim has been widely attempted and the barriers may 
prove too large to overcome.129  While it is true that the majority of rape kits 
are submitted by female victims, and therefore New Hampshire’s decision 
to neither test the kits nor toll the statute of limitations while the kits go 
untested disproportionately impacts women, it is unlikely that survivors 
could prove the necessary elements of an Equal Protection claim.130  Gender 
                                                          
 124. See Daly, supra note 1, at 31-32 (observing that there is no federal right for a 
victim to prosecute or confront her attacker); see also Hansen, supra note 66, at 966 
(explaining that there is no longer a civil remedy under federal law for victims of gender-
based violence). 
 125. See Hansen, supra note 66, at 965-89 (observing that it would be extremely 
difficult for victims to establish liberty or property interests to raise a valid due process 
claim). 
 126. See id. at 969 (noting that while the collection and retention of rape kits is a state 
action, the failure to test these kits likely lacks the level of intentionality necessary to 
bring a successful §1983 claim). 
 127. See Daly, supra note 1, at 32 (suggesting that an alternative argument might exist 
through the Equal Protection Clause, as the majority of rape victims are female and 
therefore the state’s failure to test rape kits unfairly disadvantages women). 
 128. See Hansen, supra note 66, at 962 (contending that the timely prosecution of rape 
kits would eliminate one of the major reasons for extending statutes of limitations). But 
see Kearns, supra note 7, at 358 (arguing that extending or eliminating statutes of 
limitations for sex crimes is a slippery slope that could lead to the elimination of statutes 
of limitations altogether, resulting in violations of defendants’ rights and lengthy pre-
accusation delays). 
 129. Daly, supra note 1, at 32 (suggesting that Justice Douglas’ Heart of Atlanta 
Motel concurrence may provide victims in this situation with a framework for successful 
litigation). 
 130. See Hansen, supra note 66, at 983-85 (observing that, due to recent amendments 
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classifications are subject only to intermediate scrutiny, and New Hampshire 
has no facially discriminatory law addressing the disposition of the rape kits 
it collects.131  Additionally, given the various technological and financial 
reasons states provide for rape kit backlogs, proving that the state has 
discriminatory intent would be incredibly difficult.132 
In addition to furthering victims’ interests and respecting the rights of 
defendants, a DNA tolling exception furthers an important state interest by 
increasing the number of sexual offenses that can be prosecuted.133  States 
have a strong interest in investigating and prosecuting crimes, especially in 
cases where DNA evidence is present.134  Jurisdictions that allow untested 
rape kits to accumulate see a drop in victim participation, which harms the 
state’s ability to successfully prosecute offenders.135  Conversely, 
jurisdictions that test old rape kits see a marked increase in not only the 
number of prosecutions but also the number of convictions.136  In the absence 
of any statutory or constitutional bar, New Hampshire’s failure to enact a 
DNA tolling exception reflects a series of choices that disproportionately and 
negatively impact women by providing them with little legal recourse once 
their rape kits are processed.137 
                                                          
making several state laws gender-neutral, it would be more difficult for victims to prove 
that the purpose of backlogs is to discriminate against women). 
 131. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that “classifications by 
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related 
to achievement of those objectives”). 
 132. See Hansen, supra note 66, at 985 (concluding that it is unlikely that the only 
explanation for rape kit backlogs is discrimination against women by state law 
enforcement, so an equal protection claim is unlikely to provide relief to victims with 
untested kits). 
 133. See People v. Brown, 918 N.E.2d 927, n. 1 (N.Y. 2009) (noting that the New 
York City Police Department submitted over 14,000 rape kits for testing once it received 
funds). But see Hansen, supra note 66 at 950-51 (recognizing that several jurisdictions 
that receive federal funds to address backlogs do not use all the of the money allocated, 
and therefore do not receive funds the following year). 
 134. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971) (examining the state’s 
interest in comparison to the rights of the defendant); see also Hansen, supra note 66, at 
960-62 (finding that extending the statute of limitations may be necessary to allow police 
to use all possible DNA evidence to investigate crimes). 
 135. See Hansen, supra note 66, at 959-60 (arguing that lengthy wait times between 
submission and testing of a kit make survivors of rape feel devalued by the justice system 
and consequently make them less likely to report an assault). 
 136. See Reilly, supra note 2 (stating that two years after beginning a rape kit testing 
initiative, Houston police had obtained 850 matches, 29 prosecutions, and 6 convictions). 
 137. See Hansen, supra note 66, at 983 (observing that the decision not to test rape 
kits is left to the discretion of state officials and that women are more likely to be the 
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III. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The most expedient way for New Hampshire to resolve the problem of 
rape kit backlogs interfering with rape prosecutions has already been 
proposed.  In early 2017, two bills were introduced in the New Hampshire 
State Senate that would eliminate the statute of limitations for sexual 
offenses entirely.138  These bills would not only stop the passage of time from 
rendering tested rape kits useless but would also enable victims to come 
forward at any time they felt comfortable.  Survivors of sexual assault often 
fully comprehend their experiences only long after the assault; this may be 
especially true in the current cultural climate, where the #MeToo movement 
dominates the headlines and the public is rethinking the definition of sexual 
assault.139  By doing away with statutes of limitations for sexual offenses, 
New Hampshire would be removing a barrier to justice for a potentially 
enormous swath of its population. 
Should New Hampshire choose to retain its statute of limitations for sexual 
offenses, the legislature should draft an exception that allows the statute to 
toll when necessary evidence goes untested in a rape kit.  This exception, in 
conjunction with ongoing efforts to eliminate the backlog of untested kits, 
would prevent victims of sexual assault from losing their chance at justice 
simply because their rape kit went untested.  A legislatively-produced 
exception would allow the state to decide which types of cases are subject to 
the tolling exception and which types of cases are bound by the standard 
period of limitation. 
However, legislative solutions are notoriously slow-moving.  Before 
either of the above recommendations can be implemented, the New 
Hampshire courts will most likely be put in a position where they can carve 
out a DNA exception in the same manner as the New York courts have.140  
                                                          
victims of rape). 
 138. See S.B. 98, 165th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2017); see also NH Senate Bills 
Would End Statute of Limitations for Sex Assaults, SEACOAST ONLINE, (Jan. 31, 2017, 
5:50 PM), http://www.seacoastonline.com/news/20170131/nh-senate-bills-would-end-
statute-of-limitations-for-sex-assaults. 
 139. See Rebecca Traister, We Are All Implicated In the Post-Weinstein Reckoning, 
THE CUT (Nov. 12, 2017, 9:05 P.M.), https://www.thecut.com/2017/11/rebecca-traister-
on-the-post-weinstein-reckoning.html (examining how the sexual harassment and assault 
allegations against movie producer Harvey Weinstein sparked a wave of women in 
multiple industries speaking out about the workplace harassment and assault to which 
they have been subjected). 
 140. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10 (McKinney 2014) (tolling the statute of 
limitations when a defendant’s whereabouts are unknown); see also People v. Seda, 712 
N.E.2d 682, 685 (N.Y. 1999) (creating the DNA exception in New York by concluding 
that a person’s whereabouts include his identity). 
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By interpreting the state’s existing tolling provision, New Hampshire courts 
could easily extend the same protection to adult victims that it extends to 
minors and the elderly: the right to the speediest trial possible.  There is 
ample room in the existing New Hampshire tolling provision to allow for 
such an interpretation.  The courts would also have the ability to craft the 
exception with precision to protect the constitutional rights of defendants 
while also considering the interests of victims. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While many jurisdictions have made substantial progress in reducing the 
number of backlogged rape kits in their possession, the negative impacts of 
rape kit backlogs remain.141  The confluence of backlogged kits and statutes 
of limitations for sexual offenses can result in a person who has been DNA-
matched to a crime avoiding prosecution.142  However, it is possible to craft 
an exception that tolls the statute of limitations during the period before vital 
DNA evidence is tested or matched to the defendant.143  Before the state 
legislature abolished the statute of limitations for many sexual offenses in 
2006, the New York judicial system created such an exception under the 
theory that while a victim’s rape kit remained untested, the defendant’s 
identity remained sufficiently unknown to allow tolling the statute of 
limitations.144  Under its existing statutory structure, New Hampshire courts 
should follow New York’s jurisprudence and create a similar exception.145  
This tolling exception would not infringe on the constitutional rights of 
defendants and would promote both the state’s interest in prosecuting sexual 
offenses and the victims’ interest in having their attackers prosecuted.146  
                                                          
 141. See State Responses, supra note 10 (comparing several state’s responses to rape 
kit backlogs and noting varying levels of success among different jurisdictions). 
 142. See Hansen, supra note 66, at 960-62 (observing that even states that take steps 
to address their backlog problem often lack resources to do so effectively). But see 
Kearns, supra note 7, at 329-30 (describing the exceptions to statutes of limitations 
enacted in several states). 
 143. See Seda, 712 N.E.2d at 685 (holding that while a defendant’s whereabouts are 
unknown and can only reasonably be ascertained through DNA evidence, the statute of 
limitations is tolled). 
 144. See id. (indicating that the New York tolling statute is not conditioned upon the 
victim’s knowledge of the defendant’s identity); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 
30.10(2)(a) (McKinney 2014) (abolishing the statute of limitations for sexual assault). 
 145. See § 30.10(4)(a)(ii). 
 146. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971) (finding that a person 
who has not become an accused suspect, such as by arrest or indictment, does not have 
a Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial); see also State v. Ramos, 553 A.2d 275, 279 
(N.H. 1988) (determining whether a defendant’s due process rights have been violated 
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While New Hampshire’s legislature may eventually follow in New York’s 
footsteps and do away with statutes of limitations for sex crimes, a judicially-
created DNA tolling exception can serve as a stopgap in the meantime to 
allow victims of rape kit backlogs to see justice done.147 
 
                                                          
by balancing the actual prejudice to the defendant by a trial delay against the 
reasonableness of the delay). 
 147. See S.B. 98, 165th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2017) (proposing an elimination 
of the statute of limitations for sexual assault and incest cases). 
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